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Memories, Identity and Mother Russia:  
A Study of the Russian-Chechen Conflict
Chelsea Sambells
The present Russian-Chechnya conflicts are based upon a long history of 
colonization and domination, inflicted upon the Chechen people by the Tsar-
ist, Soviet and modern Russian Federation governments, all of which have 
denied Chechnya of political and religious autonomy. In 1944, the Stalin-
ist regime, in an attempt to exert its power and control, deported and exiled 
half a million Chechens. These deportations inflicted a deep wound upon the 
collective memory of the Chechen people. Since 1944, the Russian Federa-
tion has repeatedly failed to acknowledge the oppression and brutality of the 
deportations and consequent exile (Atrokhov, 1999). Although the historic 
conflict relies upon an underlying mentality of “us” versus “them,” this as-
sumption does not serve as the core identity marker of Chechen identity. 
Instead, Chechnya’s national identity today is primarily grounded upon the 
collective memories of the 1944 deportations (Williams, 2000). This suggests 
that when an ethnic group has experienced genocide and deportation, their 
historic memories will serve a greater role in collective identity construction 
than any other relationship they have with that adversary. This research will 
further suggest that in order to construct a positive relationship between Rus-
sia and Chechnya today, the Russian government must directly acknowledge 
responsibility for the 1944 deportations, which will both help to legitimize 
Chechen victimization and recognize Russia as a perpetrator of ethnic dis-
crimination. The Russian-Chechen conflict is a significant area of research, as 
it exemplifies the importance of communication in validating victims’ identi-
ties in war, which is beneficial to peace and a nation’s foreign policy. 
Chechnya’s collective history
Nicholas Machiavelli once wrote in his work, The Prince (1999): 
Indeed, there is no surer way of keeping possession than by devastation. Whoever 
becomes the master of a city accustomed to freedom, and does not destroy it, may 
expect to be destroyed himself; because, when there is a rebellion, such a city justi-
fies itself by calling on the name of liberty and its ancient institutions, never forgot-
ten despite the passing of time and the benefits received from the new ruler. (p. 21) 
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Machiavelli’s words suggest that a nation that desires to rule another’s 
lands must do so through total devastation and destruction. If a nation does 
not break the people, the land and the spirit of that nation, then the attempts 
to colonize and subordinate an entire nation will never be forgotten by those 
peoples. These sentiments are manifested within the example of the Russian-
Chechen conflicts. The past and present Russian governments have never 
fully succeeded at totally destroying the Chechen people, while the Chechen 
people have unified and rallied around those past grievances that are remem-
bered within their collective history. 
In 1783, Tsar Nicholas II turned the Russian troops that had just de-
feated Napoleon’s armies towards Chechnya. The Tsar claimed to be protect-
ing Russian Christians from warring Muslim bandits, but it is well known 
that the Chechen land would serve as a strategic “buffer between Russia and 
neighboring Islamic territories” (Atrokhov, 1999, p. 369). Unlike other colo-
nizing nations that desired economic resources and capital from their colo-
nies (i.e. Cote D’Ivoire), Chechnya was seen as a territory that would help to 
relieve and absorb the fear of the Eastern religions. In 1816–1826, General 
Aleksei Ermolov ruled Chechnya and relocated many Chechens, while simul-
taneously populating Chechnya with Cossacks (Atrokhov, 1999). After many 
oppressive years of rule the Russians withdrew, as Russia’s attention was 
diverted towards other conflicts, leaving Chechnya in a relative autonomy 
(Atrokhov, 1999). 
During the Russian Revolution of 1917–1919, both the Red and White 
armies sought Chechnya as their prize, although neither army could defeat 
the natives’ strong resistance (Atrokhov, 1999). After the formation of the So-
viet Socialist government, Chechnya was promised full autonomy. However, 
the Soviet government only merged Chechnya with neighboring Ingushetia 
and never fulfilled the promised independence (Atrokhov, 1999). 
When Joseph Stalin came to power, he promised to solve the “Chechen 
problem” by finishing the task begun by the Tsar a century earlier. On Feb-
ruary 23rd. 1944, divisions of the Soviet government (similar to the KGB) 
“surrounded all Chechen villages and brutally herded the entire Chechen 
population on to cattle cars… (destined for) the plains of Kazakhstan, the 
taiga of Siberia and the mountains of Kyrgyzstan” (Williams, 2000, pp. 108–
109). One particular village, by the name of Khaibakh, was one of the first 
to be attacked by the Soviet officers. The personal narratives describe that 
the soldiers gave them only ten to fifteen minutes to go to the nearby train 
station; anyone who resisted, escaped or misunderstood was shot (Williams, 
2000). Possessions, from household items to cattle, were confiscated, giving 
incentive to soldiers to “prevent deportees from bringing their possessions 
with them to places of exile” (Williams, 2000, p. 110). The deportations were 
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compared with the Nazi trains to Poland, when Jews were shipped to con-
centration camps. “Thousands of Chechen mountaineers died on the sealed 
carts due to lack of water and food, poor sanitary conditions and trauma” 
(Williams, 2000, p. 104). Chechens, along with other ethnic “undesirables,” 
such as the Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, Karachais, and Balkars, were 
eradicated from the USSR’s ethnic map (Williams, 2000). In 1946, the gov-
ernment officially charged those in exile with conspiring with German of-
ficers, although German troops “never came within fifty miles of the region” 
(Atrokhov, 1999, p. 371). 
The forced exile was incredibly detrimental to the mental and physical 
well-being of the Chechen people. Within the first five years, over a quarter 
of the Chechen population perished (Atrokhov, 1999). Those in exile were 
forced, under the supervision and brutalization of camp commanders, to 
spend their time in positions of hard labour, such as the building of railroads 
in Siberia (Williams, 2000). During the exile years, Chechens grew a strong 
distrust of the Soviet system. They were not allowed to leave their “special 
settlement” areas to search for lost family and friends and those who did were 
sentenced to five years in forced labour camps (Williams, 2000). However, 
these experiences did not break the spirit of the Chechen people. One Soviet 
nationalist, after observing the prison camps, wrote of the Chechens: “Only 
one nation refused to accept the psychology of submission…no Chechen ever 
tried to be of service or to please the authorities” (Williams, 2000, p. 114). 
Meanwhile, in the Chechen territory, a permanent Soviet administration 
was established to cleanse the territory of the Chechen inhabitation (Wil-
liams, 2000). During this time, mosques were destroyed, Chechen literature 
was burned and the Chechen graveyards were desecrated (Williams, 2000). 
Especially important were the “Russification” of Chechen town names and 
the repopulation of the territory with a nationality called “Laks” (Williams, 
2000). Thus, when the Chechens returned from exile after Khrushchev had 
made a “secret” speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, denouncing Stalin’s 
treatment of the Chechens and Ingush, the Chechens had to fight both the 
Soviet infrastructure, as well as the new populations who inhabited the region 
(Atrokhov, 1999). (It is important to note that Khrushchev’s “secret” speech 
was, in fact, secret. It was not a national address or an apology, but rather a 
removal of the charges of treason laid against Chechens in 1944 for conspir-
ing with German troops [Williams, 2000]). 
From 1957 until the fall of the USSR in 1991, Chechen hostilities 
remained at bay. The fall of the USSR brought about a renewed sense of 
hope for Chechen independence, since the new Russian Federation was both 
unstable and conflict-ridden during the early 1990s. During this time, strong 
separatist movements began to emerge and Dzhokar Dudaev was elected 
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as chairman of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (ANCCP) 
(Atrokhov, 1999). An attempted coup in Moscow and the proclamation of 
Chechnya as an independent state spurred Boris Yeltsin into declaring that 
Russia was in a state of emergency (Atrokhov, 1999). The Russian Parlia-
ment voted to conduct negotiations with Dudaev, which were fruitless be-
cause Russia would not negotiate Chechnya’s independence and a consequent 
stalemate occurred from 1992-1993 (Atrokhov, 1999). In 1994, the Russian 
government supported Dudaev’s opposition parties and invaded Grozny, the 
capital of Chechnya in November (Atrokhov, 1999). Due to poor prepara-
tion and overconfidence, 90,000 Russian troops were outmaneuvered by only 
1,600–1,800 Chechen guerrillas for two long years (Kramer, 2005). 
The Khasavyurt Accords, signed in 1996 between Russia and Chechnya, 
were the first attempt at peace negotiations. Unfortunately, vague terminol-
ogy and an “unamendable Russian constitution” resulted in the failure to 
negotiate any form of autonomous state (Atrokhov, 1999, p. 384). In August 
1999, a series of events, beginning with a deadly incursion by Islamic ex-
tremists from Chechnya to Dagestan, created a large-scale resumption of 
fighting between Russian forces and Chechen guerrillas. This still continues 
today (Kramer, 2005). Most casualties from these wars are primarily civil-
ians, estimated at around 300,000 since 1999 (Kramer, 2005). The detrimen-
tal effects of these wars are insurmountable, affecting the basic necessities of 
hundreds of thousands of individuals. Unfortunately, Russia and Chechnya 
are no closer to solving this conflict, since the Russian government has not 
openly accepted responsibility for the historical grievances of the Chechen 
people. As Machiavelli stated, a nation that is still unified and not entirely 
broken by their “rulers” will never forget the past (1999).
The “us versus them” mentality and the “trump” of victimization
Since 1783, Russia has attacked and continually warred with Chechnya. Al-
though the origins of these conflicts are found in the Tsarist desire for a “buf-
fer” territory, it is important to acknowledge that Chechnya always formed 
group cohesion and solidarity through war with their principal enemy: Rus-
sia. This antithetical relationship with Russia grants Chechnya a solid foun-
dation for establishing a consistent group identity.  
Edward Said and some aspects of post-colonial theory investigate this 
opposing relationship between Russia and Chechnya. The notion of the 
“West” and the “Rest,” whereby a hegemonic entity exerts power over its 
weaker opposition, is claimed to have an inevitable relationship (Treacher, 
2005). Russia might be considered the “West,” as the major religion is Chris-
tian and Russia carries a powerful position in the global economy and inter-
national communities. Chechnya, however, could be considered the “East,” 
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as the major religion is Islam, and Chechnya has been subordinated to the 
Western powers, with no international recognition or autonomy of its own. 
This division between “East” and “West” is inevitably destined for conflict, 
which can only result in disaster (Treacher, 2005). These perspectives on the 
“other” act as a reference point of self-identification, since both sides will 
always struggle to place self and other in a difference/similarity spectrum 
(Treacher, 2005). Said warns that “we are all subject and object to one an-
other’s subject and object” (Treacher, 2005, p. 384). Obviously, this aspect of 
postcolonial theory applies to the Russian-Chechen conflicts, as both define 
themselves in opposition to the other (Williams, 2000). 
While the “us” versus “them” mentality underlies Chechen identity, 
it does not serve as the core identity marker. Instead the experience of the 
1944 deportations, immortalized within the memories of Chechen elders and 
passed down to new generations, has become the focal point in any discus-
sion about present-day Chechen identity. The belief that communal histories 
can affect the identity of nations has been studied in other contexts. The most 
obvious example would be that of the post-Holocaust Jews of Israel whose 
memories of a tragic past have shaped their identity. Vamik Volkhan argues 
that when a group cannot communally mourn or reverse a traumatic event, 
overcome with humiliation of this victimization or retaliate for it, it passes on 
this task to the next generation (Williams, 2000). 
Although the deportations and consequent exile were incredibly det-
rimental to the Chechen people, both experiences brought about unity 
and cohesion. Regardless of the high mortality rates, the birthrates among 
Chechens during the exile years were among the highest in all of the USSR. 
Chechens attributed their birth rate to a communal desire to “continue the 
people” (Williams, 2000, p. 112). According to Brian Glyn Williams (2000), 
the exile years also changed the identity of Chechens positively. The unity 
among clan-based people increased, as their experiences together as “Chech-
ens” bridged any regional differences. Also, the considerable importance of 
the Sufi Islam faith became extremely important to the Chechens (Williams, 
2000). Williams (2000) denotes that the exile experience, intended to break 
the spirit of the nation, ironically deepened the Chechen’s “sense of religios-
ity and ethnicity” (p. 113). 
This suggests that when an ethnic group has experienced genocide and 
deportation, their historic memories will serve a greater role in collective 
identity construction than any other relationship they have with that adver-
sary. As Machiavelli (1999) once stated “whatever the conqueror’s actions or 
foresight, if the inhabitants are not dispersed and scattered, they will forget 
neither that name nor those institutions; and at the first opportunity they will 
at once have recourse to them” (p. 21). Chechens have experienced victim-
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ization, along with the unifying features of it, based upon a long history of 
“otherness” with Russia. Although this is a primary identity marker of today, 
it does not mean that tomorrow’s national identity will be based upon the 
deportations. Although Chechens may continue to refer to their antithetical 
relationship as a foundation of their identity, any new acts of victimization 
will “trump” the “us” versus “them” mentality. 
Conclusion
Identity construction is an abstract process, mobilizing various aspects of 
ethnicity, history, and culture to interpret the present. Chechen identity today 
is established upon a foundation of opposition with Russia, while the primary 
identity referred to by the Chechens is related to a revival of the collective 
memories of the 1944 deportations. The Russian-Chechen conflict is a com-
plex and historic relationship that will take generations to unravel and com-
prehend. 
However, to help this process of understanding and healing, an apology 
by the Russian government to the Chechen people is required. By addressing, 
and taking full accountability and responsibility for the actions of the Russian 
governments’ treatment of the Chechens, Chechnya may be on the road to ac-
ceptance and forgiveness. A Chechen axiom states that “Nothing is forgotten, 
nothing will be forgotten” (Williams, 2000, p. 106). This indicates that the 
Chechens, above all else, will always cling to the memories of their past as a 
source of comfort and justification for modern behaviors. However, the Rus-
sian government could start to heal these historical wounds in the collective 
memories of the Chechens. One apology to the Chechen people would not 
stop the conflicts, by any stretch of the imagination. However, it would begin 
a process of discussion towards a mutual goal of peace between Russia and 
Chechnya. Although independence may never be granted to this small prov-
ince, an apology would legitimize the historical trauma experienced by the 
Chechens, as well as include Russia in a conversation that would be based 
upon accountability and compassion.
In the words of Machiavelli: “It is necessary for a prince to have the 
friendship of the people; otherwise he has no remedy in times of adversity” 
(1999, p. 43). Friendship should become the topmost priority, rather than a 
will to dominate, so that future wars might be prevented. 
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